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Abstract 
In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group-based emotions (angst, 
fear and anger), and prejudice on people’s willingness to engage in collective action against 
immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that 
in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control 
condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain 
(threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which 
threat predicted British people’s willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions 
first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 
283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake 
collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinctiveness threats 
and emotions promote such actions. 
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The Role of Threat, Emotions, and Prejudice in  
Promoting Collective Action Against Immigrant Groups 
Collective action is often regarded as a strategy used to improve or protect the rights 
of disadvantaged groups (Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). However, there are numerous 
examples of people undertaking collective action in an attempt to reduce the rights and 
resources of disadvantaged groups. For example, during the struggle for Black civil rights in 
the U.S., numerous white supremacy groups formed to violently oppose this movement. To 
date, only a small number of studies have assessed the likelihood of advantaged groups 
engaging in collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), with the majority of 
these focusing on the role of emotion in motivating advantaged groups to undertake 
collective action to help disadvantaged groups (Stewart, Latu, Branscombe, & Denney, 
2010). In contrast, our research enhances the collective action literature by assessing the 
factors that predict advantaged group members’ willingness to undertake collective action 
against disadvantaged groups. 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) postulates that advantaged group 
members are motivated to maintain their distinct and prestigious social identity in order to 
gain collective esteem. However, disadvantaged groups can threaten the advantaged group’s 
distinct and prestigious social identity (for a review, see Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). 
Such threats are likely to increase prejudice toward disadvantaged groups (Esses, Medianu, & 
Lawson, 2013; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005) and result in advantaged 
group members experiencing a variety of aversive emotions (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & 
Garcia, 2012; Wohl & Branscombe, 2009). However, there has been little research assessing 
the extent to which these factors motivate advantaged groups to undertake collective action 
against the disadvantaged group. We therefore enhance this research literature by assessing 
the role of such threats, aversive emotions (angst, fear and anger), and prejudice in 
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motivating advantaged groups to undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups. 
Moreover, we investigate both the direct effects and the indirect effects of such threats on 
collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. 
Effect of Emotions on Collective Action 
 Advantaged groups may feel a variety of emotions relating to their position in the 
social hierarchy, including pride, sympathy and guilt (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Leach, 
Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Threats to the advantaged group’s social identity can elicit numerous 
aversive emotions, depending on the appraisal of the intergroup situation (Smith, 1993). 
Appraising such threats as illegitimate is likely to result in group-based anger (Gordijn, 
Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001). This anger can be felt toward both powerful advantaged 
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) and less powerful disadvantaged groups (e.g., Leach, Iyer, 
& Pedersen, 2006). Group members may also experience anxiety-based emotions when faced 
with a social identity threat. Group-based fear may be elicited when group members feel 
unable to cope with a threat (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Kuppens & 
Yzerbyt, 2012). People also feel collective angst when they believe the existence of their 
group is threatened (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Wohl & Branscombe, 2009). Although angst is 
closely related to fear, these emotions have been found to be distinct (Wohl, Branscombe, & 
Reysen, 2010; Wohl, Giguère, Branscombe, & McVicar, 2011). Fear is associated with a 
current threat or certain danger to one’s group (Kamans, Otten, & Gordijn, 2011; Kuppens & 
Yzerbyt, 2012), while angst stems from the possibility that one’s group may not exist at some 
point in the future (Wohl & Branscombe, 2009). 
 Each of these emotions has been found to predict behavior. Numerous studies have 
found that anger motivates people to undertake collective action designed to overcome the 
threat or illegitimacy (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009; Van Zomeren, Spears, 
Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Fear is associated with avoidant action tendencies and is believed to 
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reduce the likelihood of confronting the threatening group (Kamans et al., 2011; Kuppens & 
Yzerbyt, 2012; Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009). However, research suggests 
that fear may increase people’s willingness to undertake collective action when this action is 
likely to resolve the potential threat (Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010). Fear may 
therefore promote collective action designed to overcome a perceived threat. Angst motivates 
group members to undertake actions aimed at ensuring the group will continue to exist in the 
future (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Wohl et al., 2010, 2011). For example, feeling angst as a result 
of remembering the Holocaust resulted in Jewish participants endorsing behavior to enhance 
their group by planning to donate money to Jewish organizations, wanting one’s children to 
be sent to a Jewish school and for them to be taught Jewish history and culture, and planning 
to marry someone who was Jewish (Wohl et al., 2010). Such actions strengthen Jewish 
people’s culture and traditions, helping to ensure that the group exists in the future. 
 Although group-based anger and fear have been found to predict collective action 
(Leach et al., 2006; Van Zomeren et al., 2010), the literature has generally focused on 
collective action that aims to increase the rights of disadvantaged groups (Subasic et al., 
2008). To our knowledge, no research has assessed the role of these emotions in motivating 
advantaged groups to undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups. Moreover, 
although research has assessed the role of angst in promoting actions that ensure the group 
exists in the future (e.g., wanting to marrying inside one’s group), there has been little work 
assessing whether experiencing angst motivates advantaged groups to undertake collective 
action against disadvantaged groups. Engaging in collective action against a disadvantaged 
group is likely to strengthen the advantaged group’s position, thereby helping to ensure the 
group exists in the future. As such, this form of collective action may be used by advantaged 
groups to maintain their position in the social hierarchy. Therefore, the first aim of the 
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present study was to assess the role of these emotions in motivating advantaged groups to 
undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups. 
Indirect Effect of Emotions on Collective Action via Prejudice 
Generally, intergroup emotion research has assessed the role of emotions on behavior 
without taking prejudice into account (for exceptions, see Esses et al., 2013; Leach et al., 
2006). This may, in part, be driven by intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993) stipulating 
that the interpretation of the situation and the specific emotion that stems from it may be a 
better predictor of action than the level of prejudice felt toward a group. However, research 
suggests that social identity threat promotes prejudice (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 1999; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Stephan et al., 2005), especially when the 
disadvantaged group is blamed (or scapegoated) for this threat (Glick, 2002). It is therefore 
important to consider the interplay between emotions and prejudice. 
Although the vast majority of intergroup emotion research has focused on the effect 
of emotions on behavior, research suggests that emotions also shape perceptions of one’s 
group (Livingstone, Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2016; Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, 
Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011). For example, experiencing angst, fear or anger signals that the 
emotion-eliciting other group may harm, damage or transgress against the advantaged group 
and such information is likely to signal that this group should not be trusted, thereby 
increasing prejudice. In line with this, research has suggested that various negative emotions 
including disgust (Hodson & Costello, 2007), contempt (Esses et al., 2013), anxiety (Kessler 
et al., 2010; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006), and anger can increase prejudice (DeSteno, 
Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). Moreover, research has also found that prejudice 
increases intergroup competition (Kessler et al., 2010) and reduces willingness to help 
disadvantaged groups (Jackson & Esses, 2000; Leach et al., 2006). This suggests that 
prejudice may mediate the effect of threat-relevant emotions on collective action against 
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disadvantaged groups. Therefore, emotions may have an indirect effect on such forms of 
collective action via prejudice.  
Overview of the Current Research 
 The aim of this research was to determine the role of distinctiveness threat, emotions 
(angst, fear and anger) and prejudice in motivating advantaged groups to undertake collective 
action against disadvantaged groups. Moreover, we assessed the process through which such 
threat predicts collective action intentions both directly and indirectly via emotions first, and 
then prejudice. This was assessed in a British (Study 1) and Italian context (Study 2). Our aim 
was to assess a) whether distinctiveness threat, emotions (fear, angst and anger), and 
prejudice predict collective action intentions aimed at protecting the advantaged group and b) 
the indirect effect of distinctiveness threat on collective action via first the emotions and then 
prejudice. 
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated British people’s willingness to engage in collective action 
against immigrants. Participants were informed that in 40 years the proportion of immigrants 
in Britain is likely to stay the same (control condition) or that in 40 years the number of 
immigrants is likely to be greater than the number of White people (threat condition; for a 
similar manipulation, see Outten et al., 2012). Participants then indicated the extent to which 
they felt three emotions (angst, fear, and anger), prejudice towards immigrants, and 
willingness to engage in collective action against immigrants. 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were recruited through a link on an electronic 
noticeboard that appeared when staff and students logged on to a computer at a university in 
the UK. Participants took part in the study in exchange for entry into a prize draw. Of the 322 
students and staff who started the study, 80 participants were removed for failing to complete 
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the study. We also removed 20 participants who were not British, did not disclose their 
ethnicity or were mixed-ethnicity. The final sample consisted of 222 White British 
participants (91 males, 126 females and 5 undisclosed). The age of participants was 18-68 
years (M = 32.40, SD = 11.05). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (control vs. threat). The dependent variables were emotions (angst, fear, and 
anger), prejudice, and collective action intentions. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants read information concerning immigrants 
living in the UK. First, participants were accurately informed that immigrants currently 
account for 10.8% of the UK population. Next, we manipulated the threat posed by 
immigrants. Participants in the control condition were informed that: 
Research by Professor David Coleman of University of Oxford suggests that this is 
unlikely to change in the future. His report stated that if current trends continue, in 40 years 
the proportion of immigrants and British people in the UK will remain the same. British 
people will account for 87.7% of the population and 12.3% will be immigrants. Professor 
Coleman concluded by stating that British people will remain a majority in the UK in 2051. 
In the threat condition participants were informed that: 
Research by Professor David Coleman of University of Oxford suggests that this is 
likely to change in the future. His report stated that if current trends continue, in 40 years 
there may be more immigrants in the UK than British people. British people will account for 
48.2% of the population and 51.8% will be immigrants. Professor Coleman concluded by 
stating that British people may become a minority in the UK by 2051. 
In both conditions the current and future proportion of immigrants to British people 
was graphically displayed using two pie charts, one for each time period. Participants then 
completed the following measures in the order presented. 
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Collective angst. The following items adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2009) 
were used to measure collective angst: ‘I feel concerned that the future vitality of Great 
Britain is in jeopardy,’ ‘I feel anxious about the future of British culture,’ ‘I feel confident 
that British culture as we know it will survive’ (reverse scored) and ‘I feel secure about the 
future of British culture’ (reverse scored; α = .85). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Group-based fear. Participants were asked: “When you think about the number of 
immigrants in Britain, to what extent do you feel ‘worried,’ ‘afraid,’ and ‘anxious’ (α = .93).” 
All items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely intensely). 
Group-based anger. Anger toward the favorable treatment of immigrants was 
assessed using the following items: “To what extent do you feel ‘angry,’ ‘furious,’ ‘outraged’ 
at the favorable treatment that immigrants receive in Britain?” (α = .97). All items were rated 
on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely intensely).  
Threat manipulation checks. The threat that immigrants pose to Britain was assessed 
using a measure adapted from previous research (González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 
2008). This measure assessed the extent to which immigrants pose a threat to the group’s 
identity (i.e., a symbolic threat) and a threat to the advantaged group’s resources (i.e., a 
realistic threat). Symbolic threat was measured using three items: ‘British identity is being 
threatened because there are too many immigrants,’ ‘British norms and values are being 
threatened because of the presence of immigrants,’ and ‘Immigrants are a threat to British 
culture’ (α = .95). Realistic threat was assessed using the following three items: ‘Because of 
the presence of immigrants, British people have more difficulties in finding a job,’ ‘Because 
of the presence of immigrants, British people have more difficulties in finding a house,’ and 
‘Because of the presence of immigrants, unemployment in Britain will increase’ (α = .92). All 
items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
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Prejudice. Prejudice toward immigrants was assessed using 13-items adapted from 
previous research (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000). These items included: 
‘Immigrants have become too insistent in their demands for equal rights’, ‘Immigrants are 
generally not very intelligent,’ and ‘A multicultural Britain would be a good thing’ (reverse 
scored; α = 84). These items were rated on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). 
  Collective action intentions. Participants’ willingness to engage in collective action 
was assessed using the following items (adapted from Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007): ‘How 
willing would you be to sign a petition/join a Facebook group/wear a badge/protest/join an 
email list against improving living conditions for immigrants,’ ‘How willing would you be to 
go to a meeting of local representatives/convince a friend/recruit others to oppose improving 
living conditions for immigrants,’ and ‘How willing would you be to vote for a candidate 
who disagrees with improving living conditions for immigrants?’ All items were rated on a 7-
point scale (1 = not at all willing, 7 = extremely willing). This scale was reliable (α = .97). 
Results 
An inverse transformation was performed on the collective action intention variable, 
prior to any data analysis, to correct for univariate outliers1.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine 
whether the group-based emotions (anger, angst and fear) formed separate constructs2. The 
hypothesized three-factor model did not fit the data well (Table 1). In keeping with previous 
research using similar scales (Wohl et al., 2010), further analysis revealed that this was due to 
correlations between the items within the collective angst scale3. Once the errors between 
these items were allowed to correlate the model adequately fitted the data. This altered model 
fit the data significantly better than the three two-factor models or a single factor (Table 1). 
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We therefore concluded that although these emotions were correlated (Table 2), they were 
separate constructs. 
The Role of Emotions on Prejudice and Collective Action Intentions. Symbolic 
and realistic threats were greater in the threat condition than the control (Table 3), indicating 
that the threat manipulation was successful. Moreover, people felt more collective angst, fear 
and anger in the threat than the control condition. There was a non-significant trend for 
prejudice and collective action intentions to be greater in the threat than in the control 
condition. 
Next, we tested a sequential mediator model in which the effect of threat on collective 
action intentions was mediated by first the emotions (angst, fear and anger) and then 
prejudice4. This was assessed using path analysis. Path analysis demonstrated that the 
sequential mediator model fitted the data well: χ²(2) = 3.09, p = .213, CFI = 1.00, NFI = 1.00, 
RMSEA = .052. In this model threat predicted all three emotions (Figure 1), and the emotions 
indirectly predicted collective action intention via prejudice. None of the emotions had a 
direct effect on collective action intention, although the pathway from fear was near-
significant (p = .050). This was contrasted with an alternative model in which prejudice 
predicted collective action intention via the emotions. In this model threat predicted the 
emotions directly and indirectly via prejudice. This model did not fit the data well: χ²(2) = 
13.06, p = .001, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.98, RMSEA = .16. Therefore, we concluded that the 
hypothesized model was superior. 
Discussion 
 We found that threat had an indirect effect on collective action intention via first the 
emotions (angst, fear and anger) and then prejudice. Believing that immigrants pose a threat 
to the majority group increased the aversive emotions felt towards this group. These emotions 
then positively predicted prejudice which in turn predicted collective action intention. This 
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demonstrates that emotions can have an indirect effect on behavior by shaping people’s 
attitudes toward the disadvantaged group. Although the main findings were in line with our 
hypotheses, threat did not have a direct effect on collective action intention, which is likely to 
reflect the fact that people were reluctant to endorse such action tendencies. 
In general, the results supported our hypothesis that emotions exert an indirect effect 
on collective action intention via prejudice. The aim of Study 2 was therefore to test whether 
these effects would replicate in a different national context. Study 2 also extends Study 1 by 
assessing the effects of different threats on the hypothesized processes. Previous research has 
suggested that disadvantaged groups can threaten the advantaged group’s identity and culture 
(symbolic threat) or threaten the resources available to group members (realistic threat; 
Stephan & Stephan, 1993, 1996). Study 2 aimed to determine whether the hypothesized 
model is applicable to both symbolic and realistic threats, and assess whether collective 
action intention in response to each type of threat serves different functions. Study 2 therefore 
assessed whether the hypothesized model is applicable to collective action intention that 
serves to address both culture-related (i.e., symbolic) and practical (i.e., realistic) issues.  
Study 2 
Study 2 extended Study 1 in several respects. First, this study was conducted with 
Italian participants to ensure that the effects were generalizable to other contexts. Second, we 
manipulated realistic and symbolic threat independently. Third, we measured people’s 
willingness to engage in culture (e.g., having places to worship) and practical related (e.g., 
finding a job) forms of collective action. 
Method 
Participants and Design. A total of 318 participants voluntarily took part in this 
online study in exchange for entry into a prize draw. Participants were recruited via social 
networking sites (e.g., Facebook) and emails sent by student assistants to their contacts. 
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Seven participants were excluded from the analyses because they did not report their 
nationality or they self-identified as non-Italians. A total of 29 participants were removed for 
failing to complete the whole study. The final sample consisted of 283 Italian participants (67 
males, 213 females and 3 undisclosed). The age range was 18-73 years (M = 26.23, SD = 
8.01). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three threat conditions: control, 
symbolic threat, or realistic threat. The dependent variables were emotions (anger, fear, and 
angst), prejudice, and symbolic and realistic collective action intentions.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were told that the questionnaire concerned 
Italians' opinions about immigrants in Italy. In all conditions participants were informed that 
immigrants currently account for 7.5% of the Italian population. In the control condition, 
participants also read: 
Data by ISTAT and research conducted by the National Observatory on 
Migration/Immigration Monitoring suggest that this percentage is unlikely to change in the 
future. These studies stated that if current trends continue, in 40 years the proportion of 
immigrants and Italians will remain the same. Italians will be the 90.3% while immigrants 
will be the 9.7% of the Italian population. Given that, these studies conclude that in 2052 
Italians will remain the majority in Italy. 
 In both the symbolic and realistic threat conditions participants were informed that: 
Data by ISTAT and research conducted by the National Observatory on 
Migration/Immigration Monitoring suggest that this percentage is likely to change in the 
future. These studies stated that if current trends continue, in 40 years the percentage of 
immigrants in Italy will be higher than that of Italians. Italians will be 48.2% and immigrants 
51.8% of the Italian population. 
In addition, participants in the symbolic threat condition were informed that: 
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Given that, these studies stated that in 2052 the Italian cultural situation will be 
different from nowadays. Immigrants will have several religious places (e.g., mosques) and 
cultural associations while now there are mostly catholic churches and associations 
promoting Italian culture. Moreover, because of that, immigrants’ religious and cultural 
traditions will be more common in everyday life implying that Italians will have difficulties in 
maintaining the Italian identity and culture intact. 
 Participants in the realistic threat condition were told: 
 Given that, these studies stated that in 2052 the Italian job market will be different 
from nowadays. Immigrants will do several jobs that are now mainly done by Italians. 
Moreover, because of that, immigrants will be present in every economic domain implying 
that Italians will have more difficulties in finding a job. 
  After reading this information, participants completed the following measures in the 
order presented. 
Emotions, threat, and prejudice. The emotions, symbolic and realistic threat, and 
prejudice items were the same as those used in Study 1, translated into Italian. The 
advantaged group was changed from ‘British’ to ‘Italians’. Each scale was reliable (α = .81 
for angst, .92 for fear, .94 for anger, .94 for symbolic threat, .85 for realistic threat, and .88 
for prejudice). 
Symbolic and realistic collective action intentions. People rated their willingness to 
engage in eight collective action behaviors for practical issues (e.g., finding a job, realistic 
collective action intention). As in Study 1, these behaviors included signing a petition, joining 
a Facebook group, protesting in a public demonstration and voting for a candidate who 
disagrees with helping immigrants (α = .97). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale (1 = not at all willing, 7 = extremely willing). Participants also rated eight collective 
action behavioral intentions for culture-related issues (e.g., having a place to worship, 
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symbolic collective action intention). Participants rated their willingness to engage in the 
same eight behaviors as above on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all willing, 7 = 
extremely willing; α = .97). 
Results 
A square-root and inverse transformation was applied to the measures of symbolic 
and realistic collective action intention, respectively, to prevent any potential bias caused by 
outliers on these variables5. 
Symbolic and Realistic Threat Manipulation Checks. The threat manipulation had 
a significant effect on symbolic threat, F(2, 280) = 8.37, p < .001, η²p = .06. Post-hoc Tukey 
comparisons revealed that perceived symbolic threat was lower in the control (M = 2.10, SD 
= 1.26) than the symbolic (M = 2.87, SD = 1.75; p = .006) and the realistic threat conditions 
(M = 3.01, SD = 1.92; p < .001). No significant difference emerged between the symbolic 
and realistic threat conditions (p = .839). By contrast, the threat manipulation did not have a 
significant effect on the realistic threat measure, F(2, 280) = 2.14, p = .120, η²p = .02. We 
therefore concluded that the threat manipulations successfully manipulated symbolic (but not 
realistic) threat. Given that there was no significant difference between the symbolic and 
realistic threat conditions, we combined the two threat conditions (coded control condition = 
-2 and symbolic and realistic threat conditions = 1). The fact that the manipulation had a 
significant effect on symbolic but not realistic threats suggests that this recoded threat 
variable was most likely to assess the effect of a symbolic threat on each of the dependent 
variables. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to 
determine whether anger, fear, and collective angst formed separate constructs2. The 
hypothesized three-factor model – without the within scale correlation between errors – fitted 
the data well (Table 4). Moreover, this model fitted the data significantly better than the two- 
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or single-factor solutions. We therefore concluded that although the emotions were correlated 
(Table 5), they were in fact separate constructs. 
The Role of Emotions on Prejudice and Collective Action Intentions.  The threat 
manipulation had a significant effect on angst and fear, but not anger (Table 6). Angst and 
fear were greater in the threat than the control condition. The threat manipulation did not 
have a significant effect on prejudice. Symbolic collective action intention was significantly 
greater in the threat than the control condition. By contrast, the threat manipulation did not 
have a significant effect on realistic collective action intention.    
 Next, we tested the sequential mediation model using path analysis2. This model 
adequately fitted the data: χ²(3) = 7.95, p = .047, CFI = 0.99, NFI = .99, RMSEA = .08. In 
line with the ANOVA results, the threat manipulation predicted angst and fear, but not anger. 
Anger and fear subsequently predicted prejudice (Figure 2). Prejudice then predicted both 
forms of collective action. In line with Study 1, neither anger nor fear directly predicted 
either form of collective action intention. These results imply an indirect effect of anger and 
fear on collective action via prejudice. Although there was a trend for angst to positively 
predict prejudice, this was not significant (p = .066). In contrast to Study 1, angst directly 
predicted both forms of collective action intention. This model was contrasted with an 
alternative in which prejudice predicted both forms of collective action intention via the 
emotions. This model tested whether threat predicted the emotions directly and indirectly via 
prejudice. This alternative model did not fit the data as well as the hypothesized model: χ²(4) 
= 21.55, p < .001, CFI = 0.98, NFI = .97, RMSEA = .13. Therefore, we concluded that the 
hypothesized model was superior. 
Discussion 
Study 2 results were consistent with those of Study 1 in finding that threat had an 
indirect effect on both forms of collective action intention via emotions first and then 
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prejudice. Indeed, across both studies and both measures of collective action intention (Study 
2), there was an indirect effect of threat via emotions. Although angst did not predict 
prejudice in Study 2, it is worth noting that this relationship was near-significant. In contrast 
to Study 1, the threat manipulation did not have a significant effect on anger. This may have 
occurred because participants were told how the rise in immigrants may have a detrimental 
effect on advantaged group members, thereby making anxiety-based emotions more 
prominent.  
General Discussion 
 The aim of this research was to assess factors that motivate advantaged groups to 
undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups. In both studies we found that threat 
exerted an indirect effect on collective action intention via emotion(s) and then prejudice. In 
Study 1 we found this indirect effect occurred through all three emotions (angst, fear and 
anger). Moreover, all three emotions predicted collective action indirectly (but not directly) 
via prejudice. Although the results from Study 2 are not perfectly consistent with the results 
from Study 1, most effects do replicate. We replicated the indirect effect from threat to 
collective action via first fear and then prejudice. Although in Study 2 threat did not predict 
anger, we did replicate Study 1 in finding an indirect effect from anger to collective action 
via prejudice. The main discrepancy was that in Study 2 (but not Study 1) angst predicted 
collective action directly, but not indirectly via prejudice. However, it should be noted the 
relationship between angst and prejudice was near-significant. Importantly, in line with Study 
1, neither anger nor fear directly predicted collective action. This suggests that emotions have 
an indirect effect on collective action intention via increases in prejudice. 
This research extends existing findings in numerous ways. First, previous research 
focused on the use of collective action to increase the rights of disadvantaged groups (for an 
overview, see Subasic et al., 2008). However, in the present research we demonstrate that 
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people may be willing to engage in collective action to reduce the rights of disadvantaged 
groups. Second, whereas previous research assessed the role of positive factors (e.g., relative 
gratification and pride) in motivating advantaged groups to take action against disadvantaged 
groups (Harth et al., 2008; Mols & Jetten, 2015; Postmes & Smith, 2009), we have 
demonstrated that negative emotions also promote such actions. For both relative gratification 
and threat, the anxiety surrounding the advantaged group’s precarious position promotes 
action against the disadvantaged group. Third, previous research suggested that anxiety-based 
emotions are likely to produce avoidant (Miller et al., 2009) or intra-group behaviors (e.g., 
supporting organizations that promote the advantaged group; Wohl et al., 2010, 2011). By 
contrast, we demonstrated that collective angst and fear can promote confrontational 
intergroup behavioral intentions (i.e., collective action). Fourth, we extended current research 
assessing the role of emotions on prejudice (e.g., Hodson & Costello, 2007; Riek et al., 
2006), by demonstrating the role of angst, fear, and anger in increasing prejudice toward a 
disadvantaged group and that this, in turn, promotes collective action intention.  
Intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993) claims that simply having a prejudiced 
attitude toward a group is insufficient to differentiate between the distinct types of behavior 
that is undertaken by group members. This perspective suggests that researchers should focus 
on the group-based emotions that are experienced because they are a stronger and more 
proximate predictor of behavior than prejudice. By contrast, our results suggest that emotions 
may predict collective action intention indirectly via prejudice, thereby suggesting that 
prejudice is more likely to predict behavioral intentions (i.e., collective action intention) than 
the emotions. As such, it could be argued that our research is in opposition to intergroup 
emotion theory. However, we suggest instead that our approach represents an extension of 
intergroup emotion theory rather than a competing hypothesis. We suggest that how emotions 
and prejudice are related to behavior may vary depending on the nature of the emotion. For 
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non-threatening emotions (e.g., sympathy, pride, and contempt), we argue that emotions may 
be strong predictors of behavior. However, threatening emotions (e.g., angst, fear, and anger) 
are likely to signal that a group should not be trusted. As a result, threatening emotions may 
predict behavior both directly and indirectly via prejudice. In this study we tested the extent 
to which emotions predicted behavior directly and indirectly via prejudice. However, we did 
not compare the direct and indirect effects of non-threatening and threatening emotions on 
behavior. Therefore, further research is needed in this area to test these ideas.   
Aversive emotions can increase mistrust and be detrimental for reconciliation or 
compromising efforts (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). The key to successful reconciliation entails 
alleviating the initial threat that groups perceive themselves to be facing (Shnabel & Nadler, 
2008). Therefore, in order to successfully achieve intergroup compromise, the initial threat 
should be addressed first. The use of this emotion-focused reappraisal strategy may ensure 
the needs of the group are met without further escalation of the conflict. Although such 
increase in prejudice is not functional for improving the intergroup relationship, it may be 
functional for the threatened advantaged group by serving to legitimize any derogatory 
actions that a group commits against the threatening disadvantaged group in the future. By 
legitimizing such actions, group members can undertake harmful actions toward the 
disadvantaged group without damaging their moral image or resulting in any guilt for the 
consequences (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). Indeed, a parallel can be drawn from the use of 
propaganda to dehumanize groups prior to a transgression being undertaken (Bar-Tal, 1990; 
Staub, 1989). Increasing prejudice may be, in effect, a preemptive strategy for avoiding the 
negative consequences of committing harm before any actions are undertaken against the 
disadvantaged group.  
It is also important to consider limitations of our research. First, it is interesting to 
note that while the collective angst measure was future-oriented, the fear and anger measures 
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were related to the present. It could be argued that this discrepancy might account for the 
future-oriented threat manipulation having a greater effect on angst than fear or anger. 
However, although this manipulation had the strongest effect on angst in Study 1, the effect 
size for angst and fear were not different in Study 2. Future research should shed light on 
these mixed results. Second, it could be argued that prejudice may be a consequence of 
collective action against the disadvantaged group, thereby creating a reverse causal pathway 
(i.e., emotions promote collective action intention which then increases prejudice; for a 
discussion, see Greitemeyer & McLatchie, 2011). However, previous research has suggested 
that the relationships between emotions, prejudice and behavior are likely to be bi-directional 
(Kessler et al., 2010), suggesting this may well be an additional process rather than a 
competing model. Third, in these studies we found that the advantaged group’s willingness to 
engage in collective action against the disadvantaged group was overall low. Indeed, the 
mean level of collective action intention, as well as prejudice, in Studies 1 and 2 was well 
below the midpoint of the scale. Nevertheless, despite the low means, we still found that 
group-based emotions predicted both of these variables. These low means may be because 
this form of collective action and prejudice are largely associated with right-wing political 
groups (Duckitt, 2006; Esses et al., 2013), rather than the generally left-wing university-based 
samples used in these studies. It should be noted that previous research has found that right-
wing authoritarianism predicts prejudice indirectly via threat perceptions (Duckitt, 2006). The 
fact that the current research is consistent with such findings suggests that these effects may 
be even stronger in right-wing populations. Future research is needed to provide direct 
support for such effects. 
Another limitation is that it could be argued that the threat manipulation in these 
studies was unrealistic, because it is unlikely that these advantaged groups will lose their 
majority status. However, in many nations, and especially the UK and Italy, the number of 
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immigrants is rapidly growing. Indeed, research has suggested that in both the UK and the 
US the majority White population is likely to become a minority in the future (e.g., Coleman, 
2010; US Census Bureau, 2012). Although these conclusions may be questioned, such 
findings may receive high publicity and be strategically used by political groups (Esses et al., 
2013). Therefore, it is important to assess people’s reactions to this perceived threat. 
Although the manipulation did not directly target essentialism, changes to the demographics 
of a nation are likely to alter this, potentially promoting prejudice against immigrant groups 
(Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Such beliefs may be implied in the changes to the 
population’s demographics. Moreover, Outten et al. (2012) found that such reports can 
increase anger, fear and prejudice toward immigrant groups. We demonstrate that such 
changing demographics also increase collective angst and collective action against 
immigrants.  
Believing that one’s group may lose its majority status can threaten the advantaged 
group’s position in the social hierarchy. Some researchers have suggested that in such 
circumstances advantaged group members are likely to discriminate against the 
disadvantaged group in order to secure their prestigious position (Haslam, 2004). By contrast, 
others have suggested that such groups are motivated to avoid a status-altering retaliation by 
the disadvantaged group (Van Knippenberg, 1984), thereby resulting in avoidance of 
antagonistic actions (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). The actions of unstable 
advantaged groups are likely to depend on a number of factors. Such groups may be more 
likely to take action against the disadvantaged group when they believe that their position 
would be lost if they do not act. For example, in the present research inaction would result in 
the advantaged group losing their majority status, motivating group members to take action 
against the threatening disadvantaged group in order to protect their prestigious position. 
Moreover, unstable advantaged groups may be more likely to take action against the 
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disadvantaged group when they believe that such actions are likely to be effective in 
alleviating the threat. Finally, unstable advantaged groups may be particularly likely to 
engage in such actions when the disadvantaged group is blamed (or scapegoated) for the 
potential loss of their prestigious position (Glick, 2002). 
The present studies assessed how threat motivates advantaged groups to undertake 
collective action against disadvantaged groups via the experience of emotions and increased 
prejudice. By assessing the role of such negative factors, the current research extends the 
limited existing work on collective action by advantaged groups. Moreover, our research 
enhances the emotion literature by demonstrating that collective angst can elevate prejudice 
and disadvantaged group-directed action tendencies.  
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Footnotes 
1 For the emotions, prejudice, and threat manipulation check variables, all scores were 
within 3.29 standard deviations of the mean, thus suggesting these variables did not contain 
univariate outliers. However, the collective action intention variable had three scores that 
were more than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean and thus constituted outliers. After 
applying an inverse transformation on collective action intention all scores were within 3.29 
standard deviations of the mean. Therefore, this transformation dealt with the outliers in the 
collective action intention measure. We also reanalyzed the data after removing the three 
outliers on the collective action intention scale. This produced the same results as when the 
transformed variable was used. There were also some skewed variables in the dataset (fear, 
anger, and collective action intention). Therefore, we reanalyzed the path model using 95% 
bias-corrected confidence intervals calculated using 3000 bootstrap resamples. This did not 
change the significance of the pathways. Therefore, the skew did not bias the results of the 
model.  
2 This analysis was conducted in AMOS 21 (Arbuckle, 2012). Missing data was 
imputed using full information maximum likelihood (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). 
3 There were high positive correlations between Item 2 (‘I feel anxious about the future 
of British culture’) and the reverse scored Item 3 (‘I feel secure about the future of British 
culture’), and Item 3 and Item 4 (‘I feel confident that British culture as we know it will 
survive’). 
4 Traditional approaches (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986) suggest that mediation can only 
occur when there is a direct relationship from the independent variable to the dependent (i.e., 
threat to collective action intention). However, recently researchers (e.g., MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) have argued that the 
link from the independent variable to the mediator(s) and the mediator(s) to the dependent 
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variable are the most important aspects of mediation and that mediation can occur without a 
direct effect. Given that these relationships were present, it was possible to test for an indirect 
effect from threat to collective action intention via first the emotions and then prejudice. 
5 There were 10 participants with scores that were beyond 3.29 standard deviations 
from the mean on the symbolic and/or realistic collective action intention variables and thus 
constituted univariate outliers. After applying the transformations, these variables did not 
contain univariate outliers. However, we also checked whether the results were the same 
when the participants with outlying scores were removed from the dataset. Although there 
were some significant results that became near significant (i.e., ANOVA of threat to symbolic 
collective action intention and pathway from angst to realistic collective action intention), in 
general removing these participants did not alter the significance of the results. There were 
also some skewed variables (fear and both collective action intention measures). Therefore, 
we reanalyzed the path model using bootstrapping (for procedure, see Footnote 1). This could 
only be conducted on participants will full data (N = 270). Although the direct pathway from 
angst to realistic collective action intention became non-significant, the significance of the 
remaining pathways did not change in the model calculated using bootstrapping. Therefore, 
the results were not biased by skew. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Confirmatory factor analysis for the emotions, Study 1. 
 χ² CFI NFI RMSEA χ²difference 
Hypothesized three-factor 
model 
χ²(32) = 166.43, p < .001 .94 .93 .14  
Adjusted three-factor model χ²(30) = 83.58, p < .001 .98 .97 .09  
Combined angst and fear 
two-factor model 
χ²(32) = 189.78, p < .001 .93 .92 .15 χ²(2) = 106.20, p < .001 
Combined angst and anger 
two-factor model 
χ²(32) = 382.64, p < .001 .85 .84 .22 χ²(2) = 299.06, p < .001 
Combined fear and anger 
two-factor model 
χ²(32) = 435.00, p < .001 .83 .82 .24 χ²(2) = 351.42, p < .001 
Single-factor model χ²(33) = 626.91, p < .001 .75 .75 .29 χ²(3) = 543.33, p < .001 
34 
 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations, Study 1. 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 
1) Collective angst 3.75 (1.35) -     
2) Fear 2.51 (1.44) .72*** -    
3) Anger 2.66 (1.63) .61*** .75*** -   
4) Prejudice 3.15 (0.84) .63*** .73*** .66*** -  
5) Collective action 
intention 
1.12 (0.24) .30*** .44*** .41*** .47*** 
- 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, and ***  p < .001 
Note. Table includes the transformed collective action intention variable. The mean for the pre-transformed variable was 1.36 (SD = 0.90).
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Table 3. Effect of threat on manipulation checks and dependent variables, Study 1. 
 
Control 
M (SD) 
Threat 
M (SD) 
F-values 
Symbolic threat 2.99 (1.62) 3.61 (1.82) F(1, 220) = 7.14, p = .008, η²p = .03 
Realistic threat 3.25 (1.52) 3.73 (1.65) F(1, 220) = 5.00, p = .026, η²p = .02 
Collective angst 3.39 (1.27) 4.13 (1.34) F(1, 220) = 17.74, p < .001, η²p = .08 
Fear 2.22 (1.27) 2.81 (1.54) F(1, 220) = 9.97, p = .002, η²p = .04 
Anger 2.45 (1.57) 2.89 (1.67) F(1, 220) = 4.17, p = .042, η²p = .02 
Prejudice 3.06 (0.83) 3.24 (0.85) F(1, 220) = 2.58, p = .109, η²p = .01 
Collective action intention 1.10 (0.22) 1.15 (0.26) F(1, 220) = 2.73, p = .100, η²p = .01 
 
Note. Table contains the transformed collective action intention variable. 
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Table 4. Confirmatory factor analysis for the emotions, Study 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 χ² CFI NFI RMSEA χ²difference 
Hypothesized three-factor 
model 
χ²(32) = 52.95, p = .011 .99 .98 .05  
Combined angst and fear 
two-factor model 
χ²(34) = 306.78, p < .001 .87 .86 .17 χ²(2) = 253.83, p < .001 
Combined angst and anger 
two-factor model 
χ²(34) = 411.91, p < .001 .82 .81 .20 χ²(2) = 358.96, p < .001 
Combined fear and anger 
two-factor model 
χ²(34) = 505.63, p < .001 .77 .76 .22 χ²(2) = 452.68, p < .001 
Single-factor model χ²(35) = 784.60, p < .001 .64 .63 .28 χ²(3) = 731.65, p < .001 
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Table 5. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations, Study 2. 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1) Collective angst 3.78 (1.52) -      
2) Fear 2.89 (1.64) .55*** -     
3) Anger 3.56 (1.87) .46*** .60*** -    
4) Prejudice 3.21 (1.11) .48*** .70*** .58*** -   
5) Symbolic collective 
action intention 
1.25 (0.44) .43*** .47*** .37*** .54*** -  
6) Realistic collective 
action intention 
1.14 (0.27) .37*** .44*** .38*** .49*** .76*** - 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, and ***  p < .001 
Note. Table includes the transformed collective action intention variables. The mean for the pre-transformed variables were 1.75 (SD = 1.45) for 
symbolic and 1.49 (SD = 1.15) for realistic collective action intention.
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Table 6. Effect of threat on the dependent variables, Study 2. 
 
Control 
M (SD) 
Threat 
M (SD) 
F-values 
Symbolic threat 2.10 (1.26) 2.95 (1.84) F(1, 281) = 16.47, p < .001, η²p = .06 
Realistic threat 2.29 (1.33) 2.68 (1.55) F(1, 281) = 4.28, p = .039, η²p = .02 
Collective angst 3.40 (1.47) 3.98 (1.51) F(1, 281) = 9.65, p = .002, η²p = .03 
Fear 2.49 (1.50) 3.09 (1.68) F(1, 281) = 8.70, p = .003, η²p = .03 
Anger 3.40 (1.90) 3.65 (1.85) F(1, 274) = 1.07, p = .303, η²p < .01 
Prejudice 3.17 (1.06) 3.22 (1.14) F(1, 281) = 0.16, p = .695, η²p < .01 
Symbolic collective action 
intention 
1.17 (0.31) 1.29 (0.49) F(1, 276) = 4.69, p = .031, η²p = .02 
Realistic collective action 
intention 
1.10 (0.22) 1.17 (0.29) F(1, 280) = 3.37, p = .067, η²p = .01 
 
Note. Table contains the transformed collective action intention variables. The differences 
between the results in the text and this table for symbolic and realistic threat are due to the 
results in this table being based on the combined threat conditions.
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Indirect effect of threat on collective action intention via collective angst and 
prejudice, Study 1. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, and *** = p < .001.  
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Figure 2. Indirect effect of threat on collective action intention via collective angst and 
prejudice, Study 2. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, and *** = p < .001.  
 
 
 
